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ABSTRACT 
 
Despite Africa’s relatively commendable growth performance since 2000, growth has not been 
accompanied by structural transformations. First, there has been little diversification from 
agriculture into industry, particularly manufacturing. Second, the poverty headcount and 
inequality remain high in many countries, even as African countries continue to rank lowest on 
the United Nations Development Programme’s Gender Inequality Index. This contribution goes 
beyond the individualistic approach of supply-side policies and unveils deeper mechanisms that 
need to be tackled for the two transformations (diversification and inequality reduction) to occur. 
It demonstrates that gender inequality relies on unwritten but dominant social norms, hence, 
informal institutions. The removal of formal legislation that constrains women’s agency, the 
enactment of formal laws, and the implementation of economic policies designed specifically to 
create incentives for behavior change are recommended. 
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RUNNING HEADER: ENGENDERING ECONOMIC POLICY IN AFRICA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Compared to other regional and economic blocs, Sub-Saharan Africa’s growth since 2000 is 
laudable. Commodity price increases and improved macroeconomic conditions have fueled this 
growth (African Development Bank Group [AfDB] 2013; United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa [UNECA] 2015.1 The sub-continent has grown faster than the advanced 
economies and Latin American and Caribbean countries since the mid-1990s (Figure 1). The gap 
between the African and advanced economies’ growth rates widened in the 2000s. This is 
because of the global and financial crises of 2007–8, which hit the advanced economies harder 
due to their intense financialisation and financial interconnectedness between their banks. This 
has resulted in a sharper decline in advanced economy growth rates than for African economies.  
Despite this relatively commendable growth performance, an important issue remains on 
the agenda that could reverse the growth trends. Growth has not been accompanied by structural 
transformations. We notice two structural transformations, which have been realized – at least 
partially – in Latin American growth since 2000, have been weaker in African growth, even 
though growth in both regions was driven by the commodities boom. The first structural 
transformation involves diversification out of agriculture and into industry, in particular 
manufacturing. Agriculture’s share of the gross domestic product (GDP) remained virtually 
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unchanged between 2005 and 2012 increasing from 15 to 16 percent. Industry’s share declined 
from 39 to 35 percent, while that of manufacturing declined by 2.4 percentage points to about 10 
percent. The services sector’s contribution increased from 46 to 49 percent over the same period 
(African Development Bank Group, African Union Commission, and Economic Commission for 
Africa 2014). These averages mask differences among African countries. Ghana registered a 
significant decline in agriculture’s contribution to GDP, which declined to 23 percent in 2012. 
Meanwhile the services sector’s share rose to 50 percent. This contrasts with Togo and Mali, 
which recorded increases in agriculture’s share of GDP. Only twelve out of fifty-three countries 
recorded some increase in the share of manufacturing to GDP.  
 
 
Figure 1 Growth rates for selected regional and economic blocs 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database October 2014. 
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Growth based on the rise of commodity prices will not be sustained if the excess revenues are 
not adequately invested in broadening the basis of growth. Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, Africa’s 
growth rates have not been maintained since 2010. Thus, growth strategies that broaden the 
sources of growth away from reliance on commodity price booms will increase the likelihood 
that growth will be sustained. Moreover, growth that is not widely shared in society but is 
accompanied by rising inequality can create, and in fact has created, conditions for conflict.  
The second transformation lacking in African economic growth is that of substantial 
poverty reduction and lower levels of inequality. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest growth 
elasticity of poverty among all regional groupings largely due to its low-income levels and high 
inequality (Augustin K. Fosu 2011).2 The poverty headcount remains high despite its decline 
since 2005, and inequality remains high in many African countries (AfDB 2012). African 
countries continuously have the lowest level of human development and the worst Gender 
Inequality Index (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2014). In 2013, the Gender 
Inequality Index for Africa stood at 0.578, higher than that of Arab countries (0.546) and South 
Asia (0.539) (UNDP 2014). The UNDP Africa Human Development Report 2012 reveals that 
hunger is most widespread in this region of the world, and economic growth in Africa has had 
almost no effect on under-nutrition (UNDP 2012). This failure has a clear gender dimension. 
Kenneth Harttgen, Stephan Klasen, and SebastianVollmer (2012) found that the most important 
factor for reducing child under-nutrition in Africa is women’s empowerment. Education and 
socioeconomic status of mothers, as well as their own levels of nutrition following these 
achievements, are the strongest determinants for reducing child under-nutrition.  
The post–2015 global poverty reduction goal pushed by nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) and the World Bank in the Zero Poverty 2030 campaign is quite ambitious.3 By the year 
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2030, poverty (measured as the number of people living on under 1.25 US dollars per day) in 
developing countries should be zero or at least below 3 percent. In order to achieve this goal, 
economic growth in developing countries should not only be relatively high and stable (around 4 
percent), but it should also benefit the bottom 40 percent more than the top 60 percent, according 
to a recent World Bank study (Christoph Lakner, Mario Negre, and Espen Beer Prydz 2014). 
Only when the income growth of the bottom 40 percent is 2 percent faster than that of the rest 
will the poverty elimination goal be achieved in time for the 2030 deadline. But, the authors of 
the study warn, even with fifteen years of a steady 2 percent higher income growth among the 40 
percent poorest population, the poverty elimination goal will not be met in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Instead, under such favorable growth conditions, the poverty rate in Sub-Sahara Africa will get 
down to 15 percent, which is a long way from 3 percent, let alone 0 percent. Therefore, in Sub-
Saharan Africa, even more ambitious policies of social inclusion are required as compared to 
Asia and Latin America. Sub-Saharan Africa needs growth with structural and social 
transformations. 
Social policies of inclusion must explicitly include measures to reduce gender inequality. 
The nature of the link between gender inequality and growth in Africa depends on the dimension 
of gender inequality that is being considered and the structure of the economy (Stephanie 
Seguino and Maureen Were 2014). In low-income, agricultural economies where women are 
concentrated in food production and off-farm waged labor, Seguino and Were (2014) posit that a 
reduction in wage inequality is likely to have a positive effect on economic growth in Africa. 
This is because of the expansionary effect that an improvement in women’s wages will have 
because of women’s higher marginal propensity to consume. Gender inequality in education 
reduces growth in Sub-Saharan by about 3.5 percentage points – below that of East Asia and the 
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Pacific (Stephan Klasen and Francesca Lamanna 2009). Micro-level studies also provide 
evidence on the relationship between gender inequality and output. For example, Markus 
Goldstein and Christopher Udry (2008) find that political power in rural farming communities in 
Ghana is positively associated with security of land tenure and land rights. Women are less likely 
to have political power and are therefore less likely to invest in their farms when they do not 
have security of tenure, thus resulting in lower yields. 
The recognition of the need for the two transformations – a broader basis for growth 
away from commodity price booms and more benefits from growth for the poor – has informed 
the long-term strategy of the African Development Bank Group for the period of 2013–22. The 
two objectives of its strategy are inclusive growth and the promotion of sustainable growth. The 
AfDB defines inclusive growth as “broad-based growth across sectors” that takes into account 
“age, gender, regional or geographical gaps and balances as well as sectoral differences and 
balances” (AfDB 2012: 2). Similar concerns about insufficient inclusiveness in Africa’s recent 
growth episode were echoed by the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in her keynote address at the Africa Rising conference held in Maputo, Mozambique in 
May 2014. She observed: “the tide of growth has not lifted all boats,” and “when everyone 
benefits, growth is more durable” (Christine Lagarde 2014). The first report on economic 
transformation from the African Center for Economic Transformation bemoaned that Africa was 
experiencing growth without DEPTH (ACET 2014).4 DEPTH is an acronym for diversification, 
export competitiveness, productivity, technological change, and human well-being.  
These different players in Africa’s development arena may have different priorities and 
strategies for structural transformation in Africa, but they all agree that Africa cannot continue 
along its current path. Both the AfDB in its 2013–22 strategy and the IMF explicitly recognize 
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the importance of targeting and prioritizing women, youth, and children in their agendas. The 
AfDB’s strategy aims at “broadening economic opportunities for women,” (AfDB 2013:11) 
while the IMF recommends that Africa must “invest in women” (Lagarde 2014). ACET 
recognizes that human well-being involves raising incomes, reducing poverty and inequality, and 
creating conditions for peace, justice, and security. Unfortunately, its indicators of human well-
being, such as GDP per capita and the share of formal employment in total employment, are not 
appropriate or adequate to ensure that issues of poverty and inequality along any dimension, (for 
example: class, ethnicity, gender, religion, or geography) are dealt with. The four pathways to 
economic transformation ACET proposes (labor intensive manufacturing; agro-processing; oil, 
gas, and minerals; and tourism) will have issues of gender inequality embodied within them that 
should be explicitly addressed if economic transformation is to be inclusive. The large 
development institutions clearly show awareness that women's empowerment is key to inclusive 
and sustainable growth in Africa. But neither the World Bank, IMF, the AfDB, nor ACET shows 
a systematic understanding and policy agenda of how this can be achieved. They simply reduce 
the complexities of gender relations in African economic development to supply-side policies of 
investment in women.  
This special issue provides detailed insights into how gender relates to economic 
development in the African context. It goes beyond the standard supply-side policies of investing 
in women’s education or improving access to land and credit. Instead, the contributions in this 
special issue reveal several gendered mechanisms that are often ignored by economic 
policymakers. These appear to be crucial for triggering the two transformations economic growth 
in Africa has been lacking up to now. 
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THE GENDERED CONSTRAINTS TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 
 
The eight articles in this special issue point at four gendered mechanisms at the micro and macro 
level. They go beyond the individualistic approach of supply-side policies and unveil deeper 
mechanisms that need to be tackled for the two growth transformations to occur. Supply-side 
policies focus on increasing women's individual resources, such as education and credit. These 
are obviously necessary economic strategies to reduce both gender inequality and poverty and 
social exclusion. However, supply-side policies are not a sufficient strategy because they ignore 
other dimensions of the capabilities approach and the social economics of development. These 
dimensions involve social norms and legal constraints, which can be summarized as informal and 
formal institutions. They also involve continued mechanisms of redistribution: of land, wealth, 
labor income, and social benefits. Redistribution is insufficient when it is carried out as a once-
time-only policy, such as land reform or universal primary education, because product markets 
and labor markets have their own accumulation processes, segmentation and discrimination. 
Hence, from a social economics perspective, redistribution needs to be firmly institutionalized as 
a continuous process, for example through progressive taxation, subsidies for disadvantaged 
groups and policies addressing discrimination and social exclusion. Moreover, gender equality is 
not just about more access to resources for girls and women – as if we lived in a world of plenty. 
Gender equality often implies less of the same resource provided to boys and men, as shown by 
gender budget analyses. Finally, gender equality is not only an individual process, but, 
importantly, it is also a social process. It involves women’s socially defined roles as caregivers 
for others in the household and community and involves collective agencies of women defining 
the capabilities they want to achieve. Various capabilities are not of individual character but are, 
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instead, interdependent: such as the capabilities of intellectual and social debate and the 
capabilities of dignity and respect. Supply-side policies targeting individual women’s resources 
are not the best-suited strategies to address such social-level capabilities and women’s collective 
agency to formulate and claim these capabilities. 
 Next, the four gendered constraints will be discussed in relation to the articles in this 
special issue. 
 
 
Constraint 1: Women’s lack of ownership and control over assets 
 
African women’s lack of access to land, housing, and other property rights (relative to men) is 
well-known. For example, in Ghana, women own 30 percent of gross household physical wealth 
(Abena D. Oduro, William Baah-Boateng, and Louis Boakye-Yiadom 2011). The incidence of 
ownership of agricultural land, place of residence, other real estate, and livestock is lower among 
women than among men. The incidence of business ownership is higher among women. 
However, men own larger businesses. African women have the weakest ownership rights 
compared to women in other regions of the world (see Figure 2). It is also well-known that this 
constrains women’s investment in agriculture (Goldstein and Udry 2008) and limits their 
decision making in the household (Cheryl Doss 2006). But what about households where 
husband and wife experience joint ownership? Does this automatically lead to equal control over 
assets? For example, does this lead to women being able to make decisions about land use for the 
benefit of household food security?  
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Krista Jacobs and Aslihan Kes (2014; this volume) study precisely this topic in Uganda 
and South Africa. In their survey, 10 percent of couples stated joint land ownership, and 26 
percent stated joint house ownership. Comparing women with no perceived ownership, women 
with perceived joint ownership, and women with perceived sole ownership, Jacobs and Kes 
reveal that perceived joint ownership does not provide much decision-making power to women 
compared to the category of no perceived ownership. So, perceiving that household property is 
shared, either because this is legally the case or marriage implies this to be the case, apparently 
has little effect on actual decision-making influence by women over such joint property. In 
contrast, women who stated they had sole ownership appeared to have stronger decision-making 
power over their property as compared to women stating they had joint ownership. In practice, 
men had more decision-making power over the land and house than their wives, even when both 
agreed that the assets were jointly owned. This finding implies that gender equality in the 
household in ownership does not automatically translate into joint decision making about these 
assets, even when men agree that their wives equally share ownership. These findings confirm 
the implications from other empirical studies on Africa that joint assets do not necessarily lead to 
decision-making power for women as compared to exclusive male-ownership of assets (Cheryl 
Doss, Chiara Kovarik, Amber Peterman, Agnes Quisumbing, and Mara van den Bold 2015). 
Thus, land reform and titling of assets to couples in Uganda and South Africa – but likely also in 
other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa – does not seem to challenge male authority in decision 
making about assets. Without legal enforcement of women’s individual ownership rights and 
without a change in gender norms about decision making in the household, a seemingly gender-
equal policy of joint titling has little effect on women’s empowerment and little effect on 
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investment choices in land for the sake of the well-being of all members of the household, 
including children. 
 
Figure 2 Women’s ownership rights per region of the world 
 
Source: UNDP (2012: 49). 
 
 
Yetunde Aluko (2015; this volume) looks into the decision-making power of Yoruba women in 
Nigeria when they actually do have individual property, such as land and houses. She finds that 
even when women acquire property, their husbands also exercise control over these assets.5 
Therefore, is women’s individual property ownership not the solution to the problem (as 
sketched by Jacobs and Kes)? Aluko’s response to this question is both yes and no. Yes: because 
there is at least a formal recognition – by the state and by market parties – of women’s ownership 
rights. This formal recognition of land rights is indeed what other authors emphasize to be 
important (see, for example, a special issue of Feminist Economics, edited by Cheryl Doss, Gale 
Summerfield, and Dzodzi Tsikata [2014], on land, gender, and food security). But at the same 
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time, the answer is no: individual asset ownership does not necessarily provide women with 
decision-making power vis-a-vis their male partners. This is because the idea of deriving 
bargaining power from individual assets in the household goes against patriarchal norms, in 
particular when women acquire property through the market with their own income, as Aluko 
(2015) demonstrates. Such individualism is simply rejected in Nigeria, a country that, according 
to an international value overview by Geert Hofstede (2001), ranks among the lowest in the 
world on values of individualism versus collectivism. Assets obtained through inheritance give 
more decision-making power to women because wealth accumulation through (family-based) 
inheritance is more socially accepted than that gained through (individual-based) market 
transactions. Inheritance does not involve agency but just happens as a positive, exogenous 
shock to household wealth. As soon as wealth acquisition by women occurs through their own 
agency, it is often not socially approved and hence, does not deliver the decision-making power 
individual asset ownership is supposed to deliver. Aluko’s findings indirectly support the 
findings by Jacobs and Kes. All agree that both joint assets and individual ownership do not 
deliver in terms of women’s decision-making power due to dominant social norms about men 
being the main decision maker when assets in the household are concerned. 
Both the studies – covering Uganda, South Africa, and Nigeria – point out that simply 
investing in women, whether it is through joint assets ownership or individual property rights, 
will not bring about the transformations of broader-based growth and more widely shared 
benefits from growth. When men remain in charge of decision making about assets and their 
behavior is socially legitimized, women’s own choices, related to their distinct roles as food 
providers and childcare givers, will not affect the actual use of land and other household 
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property. As a consequence, long-standing poverty-related issues in Africa, such as child under-
nutrition, are not likely to be addressed. 
 
 
Constraint 2: Unequal and high burden of unpaid work 
 
African women spend more time than men on unpaid household chores and caring for household 
members and less time than men on subsistence or labor market work (Marzia Fontana and Luisa 
Natali 2008; Elena Bardasi and Quentin Wodon 2010; Maria S. Floro and Hitomi Komatsu 
2011). The gender division of labor that makes women and girls responsible for household 
chores and unpaid care work and the lack of basic infrastructure such as pipe-borne water and 
electricity can explain the long hours women spend on unpaid domestic work. Evelyn F. 
Wamboye and Stephanie Seguino’s (2014) contribution in this special issue shows how 
important it is that the unpaid work burden of women is reduced. Their cross-country analysis of 
employment effects of trade liberalization shows that contrary to the experience in Asia, trade 
liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa has had negative employment effects for women. In 
particular, manufacturing exports and imports lower women’s employment in non-resource rich 
countries. Only food exports increase women’s jobs. The major interpretation the authors 
provide is that trade liberalization is part of a larger package of neoliberal policies, which 
includes a reduction of public expenditures. Lower investment in public infrastructure was 
correlated with lower employment for women; this is probably because it increases unpaid work 
burdens for women in terms of healthcare, water and energy supply, and other time-consuming 
tasks. That being said, neoliberal policies may push for some economic diversification; however, 
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women do not benefit when such policies include a reduction in social infrastructure 
expenditures. The private sector does not step in to reduce unpaid work burdens for women, and 
men do not automatically share in these tasks. 
Whereas Wamboye and Seguino have (2014) focused on public goods as a way to reduce 
women’s unpaid work burden, Apollo M. Nkwake’s (2015) contribution in this volume focuses 
on a more equal distribution of unpaid work between women and men. Using data from Uganda, 
Nkwake shows that fathers are most likely to share in childcare when they perceive that the 
mother’s wealth and their own are more or less equal. When fathers are richer than mothers, they 
are less likely to participate in childcare. That is because this reinforces a traditional division of 
labor in which the mother is solely responsible for childcare. Even more interesting is Nkwake’s 
finding that when mothers are wealthier than fathers, fathers are equally unwilling to participate 
in childcare. In that case, a traditional gender division of labor in childcare is reinforced by a 
reassertion of the traditional gender role of a male breadwinner. Men simply stick to the 
masculine domain of income earning: all the more so when they feel their breadwinning role is 
threatened by their wife’s income. The study shows that when fathers perceive the wealth 
distribution in the household as equal, they are most likely to do childcare work. At the same 
time, when mothers also perceive the wealth distribution in the household as equal, they are 
more likely to support fathers’ involvement in childcare. So, when both men and women earn 
incomes, when they share in the household wealth more or less equally, and both perceive this 
also subjectively, gender norms about the division of labor are most likely to change. In contrast, 
with unequal wealth distribution, stereotypical gender norms about roles in the household tend to 
be reinforced. This finding about balance in resources between the partners was also found for 
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other determinants of household bargaining in a household survey in Ethiopia (Ramzi Mabsout 
and Irene van Staveren 2010).  
Nkwake’s study provides a very interesting insight into the momentum for change of 
gender norms. The momentum for a more equal share in childcare responsibilities stems from 
mothers having more wealth without, however, tipping the balance toward too much wealth – as 
is sometimes the case in women-targeted credit programs. When equality becomes the norm in 
terms of a household’s assets, it can easily become the norm for the distribution of childcare as 
well. A change in the gender norm about husbands as breadwinners and wives as caregivers is 
not only important for social inclusion and gender equality, but also for economic growth. Irene 
van Staveren (2014) found that adherence to the social norm, or that “men have more rights to a 
job than women in times when jobs are scarce,” has a statistically and relatively large negative 
impact on economic growth in a cross-country study. A norm change toward greater gender 
equality in the gendered division of labor is likely to benefit growth as well. 
 
 
Constraint 3: Undermining social cohesion and ignoring women's leadership 
 
In Africa as well as elsewhere in the developed world, women are under-represented in 
leadership positions. Many countries therefore have designed policies to increase the share of 
women in leadership positions, both in the public and private sector. Kenya’s policy of requiring 
at least 33 percent of each gender on the boards of state-owned enterprises is a good example. 
Rwanda’s parliament has succeeded in exceeding the 2003 constitutional requirement that at 
least 30 percent of decision-making positions are occupied by women. But how does more 
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gender balance in leadership roles contribute to the two transformations of diversification of 
production and poverty reduction? The study by Els Lecoutere, Ben d’Exelle, and Bjorn van 
Campenhout (2015) in this volume sheds some light on this. They conducted a field experiment 
in Tanzania with a distribution game about irrigation water. The study analyzed the distribution 
rules of upstream living low-status versus high-status men and women with and without the 
condition of water scarcity. The results indicate that overall, low-status individuals distributed 
irrigation water equally with downstream populations when there was no scarcity, but kept more 
for themselves, depriving those living downstream from sufficient irrigation water under the 
condition of water scarcity. This is explained by a lack of diversification in the livelihoods of 
low-status individuals: with less water, they could not achieve minimum livelihood standards. 
Low-status women appeared to be a bit more generous than low-status men. For high-status 
individuals, large gender differences appeared. High-status men kept more water for themselves 
both when water was abundant and when it was scarce. In contrast, high-status women were the 
most generous group when water was abundant, giving more than an equal share to those living 
downstream. When water was scarce, they gave an equal share. The authors therefore 
recommend that higher-status women should be given leadership roles in joint-resource 
governance bodies. Not only because this is fair to women, but also because they enforce 
fairness norms in resource distribution more strongly than men and thereby strengthen social 
cohesion in their communities. Bina Agarwal (2010) has published similar findings on women’s 
leadership in community governance in the area of forestry. More specifically, a field experiment 
in Kenya with a public goods game has shown that women contribute more than men and are 
less likely than men to extract common pool resources (Abraham Waithima 2012).  
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Lecoutere, d’Exelle, and van Campenhout’s findings (2015) speak to both 
transformations. First, they point out the importance of diversification to nonfarm income among 
poor rural populations because that enables them to better deal with negative shocks such as 
water shortages. It also enables them to confront threats to their livelihoods that undermine the 
norms of fairness, which bind communities, and therefore could risk conflict. Second, they 
demonstrate that more leadership from women in community-resource governance reduces free 
riding and reinforces traditional fairness norms allowing the most disadvantaged to have 
sufficient resources to maintain minimum livelihoods. In other words, women in leadership roles 
in resource governance will help to ensure equity, but can only achieve this with diversification 
of income sources of the poor. 
The study by Bilisuma Bushie Dito (2015; this volume) on household determinants of 
women’s health in Ethiopia is also about social cohesion. It finds that the most important 
determinants of women’s health are not individual assets brought to marriage or the freedom to 
choose their husbands. Instead, it is about the social capital of these women’s families. This 
finding offers a more detailed relationship than is commonly tested in the empirical literature on 
social capital and health. The findings are very much in line with the results for South Korea 
(Sehee Han, Haeseung Kim, and Hee-Sun Lee 2012) and a cross-country study (Stephen P. 
Knowles and P. Dorian Owen 2010). Dito finds that living in their own birthplace and having 
brothers appears to contribute positively to women’s health status. Also playing a role are 
education and a lower age gap with their husbands. Furthermore, when women choose their 
husbands rather than being in an arranged marriage, these women apparently lose the support of 
their family because they have gone against the social norm of arranged marriages. So, free 
choice has a social capital cost, which materializes in women’s lower health status. Dito’s study 
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shows that policies focused on investment in women as individuals, as independent from their 
social networks, may actually trigger counterproductive reactions, as long as dominant social 
norms remain unaddressed. This is another variation on the same mechanism found in two other 
contributions to this special issue, namely those by Aluko and Nkwake. The two social 
transformations will not occur with policies treating women as individual sources of human 
capital that need investment; they will only emerge when gender norms change and women will 
no longer be punished for making their own choices.  
 
Constraint 4: Macroeconomic trends and shocks 
 
The fourth and final constraint the contributions in the special issue address concern the 
macroeconomic context and how the government responds to changes in this context. Allison 
Loconto’s (2015; this volume) contribution analyzes the impact of a well-meaning fair trade 
strategy on workers on tea plantations in Tanzania, a country where 50 percent of tea is grown 
under fair trade conditions. She finds that fair trade standards do not provide value added to the 
existing labor laws and do not ensure gender equality beyond basic labor rights. Instead, her 
research finds that the trends of mechanization and higher-skill needs would make women’s jobs 
more vulnerable than men’s jobs. Moreover, her study finds that women are largely under-
represented in management positions in tea production; therefore it is unlikely the threat of 
mechanization to gender equality will be raised and addressed at the firm level. Loconto’s study 
demonstrates that fair trade standards cannot address the bigger changes occurring in the tea 
value chain. This would call for government action as well as a greater responsibility from 
importing countries to reduce the protection of markets against processed tea. The only way to 
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remedy the situation would be for Tanzania to move up the value chain and to compensate for 
job losses among unskilled workers due to mechanization with new jobs in processing and other 
activities higher up the value chain: consider jobs on the assembly line of tea packaging and iced 
tea production as well as diversification outside the tea sector in other food and non-food value 
chains in off-farm employment (see, for example, a recent FAO study on this by Elisendra 
Estruch and Illeana Grandelis [2013]). This would be a good example of the diversification 
called for by the AfDB and ACET. At the same time, it would help the second transformation, 
namely reducing poverty and inequality by creating higher value added jobs with higher wages. 
This strategy may reduce growth in the short run, but it is likely to increase growth in the long 
run, according to a model developed by Stephanie Seguino and Mark Setterfield (2010). 
The study by Ismaël Fofana (2015; this volume) takes an oil price shock as the starting 
point of a model simulation for the South African economy. He shows that an oil-importing 
country like South Africa clearly suffers from a doubling of the oil price, but the government 
policy response matters. His model shows that women’s jobs suffer more than men’s jobs 
because they are largely in the non-trade sector, including the public sector. But when the 
government makes an effort to protect these jobs, by running a budget deficit, the negative effect 
on women’s employment is reduced. His study shows that government responses to 
macroeconomic trends and shocks make a difference for gender equality. This is even more 
important because an oil-price shock will also increase women’s unpaid work burden because 
households will substitute more expensive oil-price related inputs bought in the market with 
more unpaid work. This happens, for example, when substituting cooking fuel with collecting 
firewood and substituting purchasing bus tickets with walking to the market. Fofana’s simulation 
model thereby nicely illustrates how a seemingly gender-neutral price shock, not induced by any 
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macroeconomic policy, can have serious gendered effects. And when such effects are not 
compensated by price subsidies and other (temporary) government policies, the transformation of 
economic growth toward lower poverty levels and less inequality will not be realized. It is 
precisely a gender analysis of price shock effects on both paid and unpaid work that reveals this 
fact. The value added to the literature is that the origin of the change does not stem from any 
macroeconomic strategy, such as liberalization, privatization, or removal of a subsidy, but from 
an exogenous price shock and understanding that the effect can be relatively easily mitigated.  
 
FROM FORMAL TO INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND FROM INDIVIDUAL TO 
SOCIAL LEVEL POLICY FOCUS 
 
Structural transformation toward combined growth and gender equality cannot result from rights 
and regulations alone, even with adequate enforcement. Equal rights and access to resources for 
women can support economic growth. In particular, equal school enrollment for girls as 
compared to boys increases average human capital in the labor force, which helps to improve 
average labor productivity (Stephan Klasen 2002; Esther Duflo 2012). Similarly, when women 
have solid rights over the land they work, they are more likely to invest in the quality of the land. 
This contributes to higher yields (Cheryl Doss, Gale Summerfield, and Dzodzi Tsikata 2014). 
Furthermore, credit can help women entrepreneurs improve their businesses in a variety of ways, 
leading to their contributing to greater household income and perhaps business expansion 
(Donna Kelly, Candida Brush, Patricia Greene, and Yana Litovksy 2012). At the same time, 
economic growth can support gender equality (Günseli Berik, Yana van der Meulen Rogers, and 
Stephanie Seguino 2010; Irene van Staveren 2011). Higher levels of GDP enable higher tax 
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revenues, which can help finance more girls’ school enrollment, land titling, and credit 
programs. Additionally, economic growth often generates employment, with opportunities for 
both men and women (Naila Kabeer and Luisa Natali 2013). 
Neither of these two directions of the relationship between growth and gender equality 
occur automatically. Win-win outcomes need to be enforced and are never automatic. However, 
win-win outcomes for growth and gender equality cannot be enforced through more rights and 
regulations, or even stronger enforcement. This is because gender inequality is not a matter of 
formal institutions. The contributions to this special issue demonstrate that gender inequality 
relies on unwritten but dominant social norms, hence, informal institutions. Without affecting the 
dominant asymmetric norms in societies (for example, norms that do not affect different social 
groups in the same way), growth is not likely to become inclusive for women and will certainly 
not be socially transformative. 
Some African countries uphold asymmetric laws that constrain women’s agency. Certain 
laws exist requiring a woman to obtain her husband’s permission before she can open a banking 
account, and husbands can oppose wives’ choice of occupation (Mary Hallward-Driemeier 
2012). Moreover, many African countries, including some with asymmetric laws, suffer from 
asymmetric institutions, in particular gendered informal ones. These include widespread child 
marriage (under the age of 19), practices of female genital mutilation in some regions, 
widespread domestic violence, and masculinity ideals tied to household headship, 
breadwinnership, and the number of (male) children. These gendered, informal institutions 
determine the gendered division of labor. First, consider in the household how men and women 
divide up paid and unpaid work. For example, Nkwake’s (2015) study on fathers’ involvement in 
childcare in Uganda shows the dominance of the norm that mothers spend much more time than 
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fathers providing childcare. Second, consider the labor market, where women are concentrated in 
low-end jobs, largely in the informal economy and non-tradable sectors. Loconto’s (2015) study 
on fair trade standards in tea production in Tanzania illustrates how mechanization creates new 
job opportunities for technically skilled workers, who are almost always men, while workers 
who hand-pick the tea in the fields will find less and less employment, and these tea field 
workers are very often women. 
The gendered informal institutions also affect patterns of reward. Where women’s major 
role is seen to be in the household, focusing on childcare, food provisioning from the land around 
the house, and cooking and cleaning, women are not seen as in need of cash, savings, or financial 
independence. This is often reinforced by inheritance laws and practices, making women 
dependent upon their brothers or sons rather than inheriting in their own right. Aluko’s (2015) 
study on women’s land rights and incomes in Nigeria shows how informal property rights 
systems among the Yoruba support patriarchy in a variety of ways, overriding formal property 
rights. An earlier study on gender norms among the Yoruba has also shown how these constrain 
women’s decision-making power (Sunbo Odebode and Irene van Staveren 2007). 
Finally, gendered informal institutions affect the opportunities of men and women in the 
economy. The double role of women, with a high, unpaid workload in addition to the expectation 
to provide herself and her children with basic needs, provides a serious constraint on her 
opportunities. First of these is a time constraint. The combined paid and unpaid workday of the 
average African woman is longer than that for the average African man, particularly in rural 
areas (C. Mark Blackden and Quintin Wodon 2006). Second, there is a mobility constraint. With 
the nearly sole responsibility for childcare, women cannot easily travel far for better sales 
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markets for their products or to find employment (see, on South Africa, Taryn Dinkelman, 2011). 
Additionally, social norms constrain traveling for women (Gina Porter 2011).  
Gendered, informal institutions involve the gender division of labor, asymmetric patterns 
of rewards, and asymmetric opportunities for men and women. As a response, many African 
countries have developed gender policies, and donors support women's empowerment programs 
in support of such gender policies. Key components of women’s empowerment programs are 
equal property rights, access to education at all levels, and equal access to credit. These are all 
hoped to increase and strengthen women’s employment and incomes. However, much of these 
efforts are based on an individualistic paradigm of empowerment as individual autonomy. It 
assumes that when women become more financially independent from men, educated and with 
their own assets and income, this will gradually undermine the asymmetric informal institutions 
that greatly constrain women. This individualistic approach to empowerment is supported with 
more equal formal institutions, such as equal land rights, equal inheritance rights, free education 
for all, and laws against domestic violence. These formal institutions are assumed to improve 
women’s fallback position in case of separation, divorce, widowhood, or domestic violence. But 
is this indeed an effective approach toward women's empowerment and gender equality? 
The contributions to this volume raise questions about this policy paradigm that is on the 
one hand individualistic, and on the other hand relying only on formal institutional change. 
Nkwake (2015) argues that fathers who perceive their wives to be richer, do not spend more 
hours in childcare. Apparently, more income or assets do not function as bargaining power to 
reduce women’s high unpaid workload, vis-a-vis their male partners. At most, they have gained 
the opportunity to pay outside parties – a third person – to help with childcare and homework. 
Aluko explains how successful businesswomen become increasingly responsible for household 
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expenditures without hope to accumulate assets in their own name. Their male partners’ assets 
remain protected by customary law, which the increased bargaining power of women cannot 
affect. Loconto shows how adequate implementation of labor standards has no effect on the fact 
that women do the lower paid jobs and men perform the higher paid jobs. Only upgrading along 
the value chain alongside changes in gender norms driving occupational segregation will show to 
be effective. This requires sectoral shifts from agricultural production to processing and active 
policies against gender stereotyping at work. 
The special issue makes clear that gender policies that only rely on more equal formal 
institutions and take an individualistic view of women's empowerment do not necessarily affect 
gendered informal institutions, and they thereby do not necessarily contribute to the social 
transformation needed to happen to make growth inclusive.  
When men perceive their masculinity threatened rather than transformed, women may 
gain jobs and assets, but neither the individual agency nor the collective agency enjoy the 
benefits of these resources in their economic and social lives. The constraints of informal 
institutions for women’s empowerment have been demonstrated at the cross-country level (Irene 
van Staveren 2013) as well as for individual countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (for Ethiopia, see 
Mabsout and van Staveren [2010]; for Burkina Faso, see Harounan Kazianga and Zaki Wahhaj 
[2013]; for Tanzania, see Seema Vyas, Jessie Mbwambo, and Lori Heise [2015]). That is why 
economic policies urgently need to address the dominant gendered informal institutions in 
Africa. A number of actions can be taken in this regard. A first step is to remove formal laws 
discriminating against women. The continued existence of formal laws that discriminate against 
work provides legitimacy for informal asymmetric institutions. Moreover, existing gender equal 
laws require consistent enforcement, something, which is lacking in many African countries 
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around the minimum marriage age, female genital mutilation practices, and domestic violence 
for example. Second, awareness campaigns and social contracts with local communities can be 
introduced to change behavior and cultural norms and practices. A clear understanding of the 
particular institutional binding constraint on women’s agency will be required to inform 
decisions being made on what policies to introduce. This is because different norms and values 
have different effects on different dimensions of gender inequality. For example, health may be 
affected more by norms about land rights, whereas education may be affected more by norms 
around child marriage (van Staveren 2013). Success in reducing the practice of female genital 
mutilation, or FGM, in Sahel countries has been made through dialogue and involvement of 
religious leaders at village level (United Nations Children Fund [UNICEF] 2005). Change is 
slow, but it does happen. In Ghana, the Intestate Succession Act (Law 111) was introduced in 
1985 to avoid the injustices that widows experience when their husbands died before having 
made a will. Despite the weaknesses of the law in its design and the difficulties women have in 
making recourse to it (Jeanmarie Fenrich and Tracy E. Higgens 2002), its enactment has brought 
about some behavioral change. Agnes Quisumbing, Ellen Payongayong, J.B. Aidoo, and Keijiro 
Otsuka (2001) in a study of farming households in the Western Region of Ghana found that 
about 41 percent of Akan households who traditionally tend to practice matrilineal inheritance 
distributed inherited property using the law. In a more recent study using a sample of widows in 
four villages in the Greater Accra Region and Central Region a much smaller proportion of 
widows reported that Law 111 informed the distribution of their deceased spouse’s estate. The 
incidence of the application of Law 111 is higher among widows who know about the law 
(Edward Kutsoati and Randall Morck 2012). This suggests that the introduction of laws aimed at 
eroding the fabric of asymmetric cultural norms and practices must be accompanied by effective 
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public awareness strategies that discuss their intended effects, benefits, and potential costs. 
Third, economic policies should be designed to create incentives for behavior change that 
translates into changes in informal institutions. The narrowing of the gender gap in primary 
school enrolment in many African countries can be attributed among other things to the 
education subsidies that reduce the direct costs of schooling and financed the construction of 
education infrastructure that reduced the distances to access schools (Peter Glick 2008). In 
Nigeria, for example, Jane A. Lincove (2009) finds an inverse relationship between distance to 
primary school and the probability of boys and girls ages 6–12 years being enrolled in school. 
The successful design of policies that intend to encourage behavior change is premised on 
policymakers being cognizant of and understanding the implications of gendered contexts on 
growth, development, poverty reduction and the well-being of the entire citizenry.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is only when gendered informal institutions become symmetric between women and men that 
the gender division of labor will become fluid and more pragmatic rather than ideological; 
rewards for work will become more determined by productivity rather than segmentation; and 
opportunities for women and men, fathers and mothers, will become more equal. Without 
policies focusing on the transformation of gendered informal institutions, empowerment policies 
and economic growth are not likely to bring the social transformation of poverty reduction and 
more equality, benefitting men and women alike.  
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NOTES 
1 The focus of this special issue is on Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa will be 
used interchangeably. 
2 East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East, 
and North Africa and South Asia. 
3 http://zeropoverty2030.org/the-campaign/. 
4 ACET is a think tank that conducts research on issues surrounding economic transformation. It 
provides advisory support to governments and undertakes advocacy work.  
5 A study among married Igbo women in southeastern Nigeria arrives at similar conclusions 
(Joachim C. Omeje, Sarah N. Oshi, and Daniel C. Oshi 2011). Individual ownership of assets 
such as vehicles, farmland, milling machines, and televisions does not increase women’s 
participation in reproductive decision -making because husbands control how revenue generated 
from the assets is spent. The study, however, does not investigate whether the assets were 
acquired through inheritance or purchase. 
 
                                                        
